Clarifying ‘Strategy’ and ‘Grand Strategy’

Rovner’s Strategy and Grand Strategy does an excellent job of clarifying the differences between the two subjects in its title. As he describes it, strategy is a “theory of victory” that explains how to achieve wartime political goals, while grand strategy is a “theory of security,” aiming at ensuring state survival and success.

One of the book’s strengths is that after briefly discussing these ideas as abstractions, it delves into four case studies that illustrate the tensions between strategy and grand strategy. These include the Peloponnesian War of the late fifth century B.C., Britain and France during the War of the American Revolution, the Cold War (with an emphasis on the Vietnam War), and the decades of the “War on Terror.” Of these, the most compelling story emerges from how Britain and France dealt with the American Revolution. The author points out how Britain recovered from its strategic loss, refining its grand strategy in ways that enhanced its security. Shorn of its most populous and rambunctious North American possessions, Britain was able to diminish the size of its army and redouble its naval focus. France’s already dire fiscal situation was greatly exacerbated by lavish wartime spending, so that a strategic victory undermined the stability of the state, helping to instigate its own revolution six years after peace was concluded.

The chapter describing the Cold War discusses how strategy and grand strategy differed during that conflict, but its most vivid portrayal is of how an excessively operational and even tactical focus contributed to strategic failure in Vietnam. President Johnson and his immediate subordinates became so obsessed with meticulously planning bombing raids that they lost sight of the strategic picture. The assumption was that relentless bombing would eventually compel the enemy to accept favorable terms, in accord with Air Force doctrine, so extensive presidential-level decisions about what to bomb would inevitably lead to strategic success. The author cites Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win, which uses historical evidence to demolish the assumption that strategic bombing will compel surrender. Rovner notes that the president and cabinet found it easier to shape tactics than to thoughtfully ascertain how to achieve strategic victory, let alone to grapple with the grand-strategic implications of either victory or defeat, beyond the false platitudes of the domino theory.

After describing the case studies, the author briefly highlights some strategic and grand-strategic issues in information technology and cyberwar, as well as contemporary issues relating to Ukraine, Israel, and the United States.

Overall, Strategy and Grand Strategy provides insights into the ever-important distinction between strategy and grand strategy, with considerable pertinence to today’s challenges. These considerations override its high price. Moreover, the cliché that a book should not be judged by its cover definitely applies here, given the odd cover image of an eighteenth-century cartoon in which a devil flies away with America while a personification of France taunts his bereft British counterpart.

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Our Reviewer: Dr. Scott Savitz is a defense researcher in the Washington, DC area. He earned his doctorate and a master’s degree at the University of Pennsylvania, as well as a bachelor’s degree from Yale University. A senior engineer at the RAND Corporation. He has led research on such diverse subjects as employment of unmanned maritime vehicles, the impact of non-lethal weapons, addressing threats from naval mines, testing of autonomous systems, gaps in Arctic military capabilities, how to make airbases less vulnerable, and many other topics. He is the author of The Fall of the Republic, a fictionalized account of the Catiline Conspiracy in ancient Rome. His previous reviews include Machiavelli's Legacy: The Prince After Five Hundred Years, The Machiavellian Enterprise: A Commentary on The Prince, Machiavelli's Three Romes, Great Power Clashes along the Maritime Silk Road, The Crisis of Catiline, and War Underground: A History of Military Mining in Siege Warfare.

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Note: Strategy and Grand Strategy is also available in e-editions.

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